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Abstract  
This paper examines the association between one of the most basic institutional forms, the 
family, and a series of demographic, educational, social, and economic indicators across 
regions in Europe. Using Emmanuel Todd’s classification of medieval European family 
systems, we identify potential links between family types and regional disparities in 
household size, educational attainment, social capital, labor participation, sectoral structure, 
wealth, and inequality. The results indicate that medieval family structures seem to have 
influenced European regional disparities in virtually every indicator considered. That these 
links remain, despite the influence of the modern state and population migration, suggests 
that either such structures are extremely resilient or else they have in the past been 
internalized within other social and economic institutions as they developed. 
 
Keywords: Institutions, family types, education, social capital, labor force participation, 
economic wealth and dynamism, regions, Europe 
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Introduction 
 
The role of institutions as factors shaping human activity has attracted enormous 
attention in recent years. It has become increasingly clear that institutions, such as 
political systems (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001 and 2005), the legal rights 
of the individual (North 1990), or the various forms of ‘social capital’ amongst groups 
(Putnam, 1993 and 2000; Storper, 1997 and 2005) can have a significant bearing on a 
society’s ability to generate innovation, wealth, and growth. Yet, despite this growing 
interest, there is little consensus about either the type of institutions that have the 
greatest impact, or how institutions and their effects evolve over time. This paper 
examines the role within Europe of an often overlooked institution, the family, and 
concludes that its importance in determining socio-economic outcomes may have 
been greatly underestimated. Furthermore, the use of an historical data set allows us 
to present hypotheses regarding the persistence and evolution of institutions and their 
influence on contemporary European social and economic disparities.  
 
The importance of institutions is usually deemed to lie in their role in reducing the 
risks and transaction costs of investment and exchange (Parto, 2005). Dealing with 
another member of a community to which one belongs and so with someone either 
known personally, or through a mutual acquaintance, reduces the risk of fraud, 
unreliability or incompetence (Putnam, 1993, 2000); such examples can be deemed 
‘informal’ or ‘community-type’ institutions and include norms, traditions and social 
conventions, interpersonal contacts, relationships, and informal networks (Rodríguez-
Pose and Storper, 2006: 1). Dealing with a person bound by law to honor a contract, 
or a person checked via a credit bureau, for example, illustrates that similar benefits 
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can be gained at a societal level through official institutions (North, 1990, Acemoglu 
et al 2001, 2005). These institutions can be defined as ‘formal’ or ‘society-type’ 
institutions and are usually defined by more transparent and codified rules 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Storper, 2006: 2). Both formal and informal institutions are 
deemed to have an influence on socio-economic outcomes (Putnam, 1993) and both 
have been strongly associated with indicators of innovation and dynamism 
(Schumpeter, 1926; Putnam, 1993; Storper, 1997 and 2005). In fact, some studies 
have suggested that the role of institutions in general may be absolutely fundamental 
to explaining both economic growth and economic disparities. The substantial body of 
work in recent years of Acemoglu and his collaborators (Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson 2001 and 2005), for example, argues powerfully that the richest and poorest 
nations of the world owe their position more than anything to the political and legal 
institutions they developed or inherited from their colonial masters.  
 
Institutions, however, can also act as a hindrance to economic development. In terms 
of formal institutions, an overdeveloped system of laws and regulations can increase 
transaction costs to the point where exchange or investment becomes unattractive. In 
terms of informal institutions, the very formation of a group implies the exclusion of 
non-group members, and a lack of transparency and predictability which may 
engender inefficiencies and corruption. Most work in the field of social capital has 
tended to focus on the strengths of formal or ‘society’ institutions in contrast to the 
weaknesses of informal, ‘community’ institutions (North, 1990; LaPorta et al, 1999; 
Rodrik et al, 2004) or vice versa (Granovetter, 1985; Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 2000), 
while others have involved themselves in debates concerning which of the two is 
more significant (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004). Typically since Weber (1921) 
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society-type institutions have been seen as more modern and efficient, and conducive 
to an industrialized economy, while community-type institutions are seen as 
backward. More recently, others have attempted to synthesize ‘society’ and 
‘community’ by noting how each type operates most beneficially in the presence of 
the other (Storper, 2005; Rodríguez-Pose and Storper, 2006). The latter approach 
posits that a balance of community and society is required in order to generate best-
case outcomes in terms of micro-economic confidence, social policy and problem 
solving, all of which are then linked to economic dynamism and growth.  
 
However, there is little in the literature which considers the role of one of humanity’s 
most basic forms of institution, the family, in determining either economic disparities 
or other forms of social or economic outcomes which have, in turn, an influence over 
economic development. Although this may underestimate the role of the family as a 
unit for both production and reproduction, researchers have traditionally assumed that 
the impact of family structures tends to be lower than that of other institutions, such as 
the state, religion, or the law, if only because of their small size, the limited range and 
influence of the transactions that take place within them, and their heterogeneity (see 
Todd, 1990a, for a discussion on this point). However, some academics have noted 
strong patterns of family structure, with clear regional variations and persistence over 
time and linked them to significant social and economic outcomes. This includes the 
seminal work of Emmanuel Todd (Todd, 1990a; 1990b), upon which this study draws 
considerably, and the more recent work of Greif (2005, 2006).  
 
This paper uses Todd’s (1990a) classification of family types in order to determine 
whether the existence or persistence (either directly or through intermediate 
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determinants) of medieval family types are associated with existing regional 
differences, including household size, educational attainment, labor participation, 
social capital, sectoral structure, and economic wealth and inequality, across regions 
of Europe. In so doing we hypothesize that the fundamental drivers behind the 
persistence of regional disparities across Europe maybe rooted in institutional factors, 
such as family types and structures, whose origins can be traced at least to the Middle 
Ages, if not earlier. The paper uses regression analysis to establish the strength of the 
correlations between family structures and the dependent variables. This analysis 
enables us to offer some initial ideas regarding the role of family structure both in the 
development of other institutions and in economic development in general about 
which, to date, we have known ‘surprisingly little’ (Greif, 2005, p.2). 
 
The paper is divided into the following sections: first we examine Todd’s 
classification of family structure, including the presentation of a map showing how 
different family types are spread throughout Europe. Section 2 explains some of the 
issues surrounding the concept of the persistence of family types throughout history 
and reviews some of the theories linking family structures to regional economic and 
institutional outcomes. Section 3 describes the model, while section 4 presents our 
results, and then analyses them with a view to understanding how they may fit into 
existing conceptual frameworks. Finally, we conclude by observing that there do 
indeed appear to be strong links between family types and our dependent variables, 
and offer some initial thoughts of how this might affect our understanding of 
institutional and economic development in modern European history. 
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1. Todd’s classification of family structures 
 
Todd’s 1990 work (Todd, 1990a, L’invention de l’Europe - The invention of Europe, 
Paris: Seuil) provides the characterization of family types which forms our key 
explanatory variable. His classification of families has two main organizing 
principles. First, families differ in how parents and children interact. At one extreme, 
children leave the parental nest as soon as they reach (early) adulthood and become 
independent from parental authority at an early age. At the other extreme, children 
remain subjected to their parents’ authority long after reaching adulthood and even 
after marrying. In other words, the relationship between parents and children can be 
thought of as either ‘liberal’ or ‘authoritarian’. The second organizing principle refers 
to the nature of the relationship between siblings. At one end, siblings (or, at least, 
brothers) may be treated as equal, whereas, at the other, parents may favor one 
particular child (often the eldest) at the expense of the others. On this basis, families 
can be characterized as ‘equal’ or ‘unequal’.  
 
These two oppositions, liberal/authoritarian and equal/unequal, are interesting for 
several reasons. First, they capture two fundamental dimensions, liberty and equality, 
which matter both within families and the wider society. With early childhood 
experiences having some bearing on adult values and behavior (see Gross and 
McIlveen, 1998, chapters 39, 43, and 44, for an introduction to the vast psychology 
literature on these issues and also Bisin and Verdier, 2000, for an economic 
discussion of cultural transmission in the US), these categories provide us with an 
obvious channel of transmission from ‘family values’ towards broader economic 
outcomes. Second, this two-dimensional characterization avoids more simplistic 
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oppositions (such as strong versus weak families) which, as we will see in our results, 
are hard to substantiate empirically. On the other hand, this typology avoids too much 
complexity and subtlety which would be hard to put to the data. Third, these 
categories are easy to measure empirically (see below) and most regions of Europe 
typically fall into one category or the other for both dimensions. Furthermore, it also 
appears that different family types seldom coexist in the same area. 
 
To measure liberal versus authoritarian families, Todd (1990a) looked at the 
cohabitation between generations within families, most particularly between parents 
and their married children. Where familial authority is strong, the eldest son does not 
leave the family home when he marries, but remains under the authority of the father. 
Similarly, unmarried adult daughters also typically remain in the family home under 
the authority of, first, their father and then their brother. These types of family are 
termed ‘stem’ families, in contrast to ‘nuclear’ families where familial authority is 
said to be weak. Nuclear families only remain together while the children are growing 
up and, on marrying, or even on reaching adulthood, children leave the parental home. 
In effect, such children also leave behind their dependence on their parents, and the 
authority which their parents hold over them.  
 
To obtain systematic data for western Europe, Todd first used censuses from western 
European countries in the 1950s and 1960s. Using the administrative divisions of the 
time, he identifies regions of stem families as regions with a ‘high’ proportion of adult 
children living with their parents, conditional on the fraction of population working in 
agriculture (since, all else being equal, parents and married children tend to live 
together more often in rural areas). By the 1950s and 1960s, the proportion of adult 
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children living with their parents in stem family areas was typically low, often less 
than 10%. In order to check that these areas were historically dominated by stem 
families, rather than merely ‘backward’ or otherwise anomalous, Todd went through a 
very large number of historical monographs about particular regions (nearly 200 are 
cited in his 1990 book) and verified whether they contradicted his classification. He 
claims to have found no indication contrary to his original classification and to have 
made only very small adjustments. Since some of these monographs go back more 
than 500 years, this is strongly suggestive of lasting and stable patterns (and for this 
reason we refer to family types as medieval). There is some evidence that these 
patterns could be even older than this. For instance, the prevalence of stem families in 
French Brittany, north western Spain, Wales, and Scotland coincides with areas where 
Celtic populations took refuge two millennia ago. The area of egalitarian families 
with strong parental authority in central Italy ties in closely with the area of Etruscan 
civilization in pre-Roman times.  
 
In order to measure equality, Todd followed the same approach of using relatively 
recent data for the whole of western Europe while checking whether the patterns that 
were uncovered were reflected in historical monographs. The key indicator of equality 
and inequality is what happens to family property after the death of the parents. 
Equality is said to be strongest where family property is divided most evenly between 
siblings, or (more usually) between brothers. Areas in which equal familial systems 
are operating are identified, therefore, by inheritance laws and practices. Some care is 
needed, however. In areas of nuclear families, inequality is easily identified by the 
institution of wills and testaments to define the final holder of the family property. In 
these areas, one child tends to inherit at the expense of his or her siblings. Families 
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that combine inequality and liberalism are called ‘absolute’ nuclear by Todd (1990a). 
In the remaining areas of nuclear families, wills and testaments are unnecessary, as 
children, at least sons, inherit equally. This ‘egalitarian nuclear’ system encourages 
the persistence of slightly stronger relations among children until the inheritance is 
completely divided after the parents’ death (Todd, 1990a: 37-38).   
 
Wills and testaments are also unnecessary in areas dominated by authoritarian stem 
families as the property is passed by strength of tradition to the eldest son, resulting in 
an institutionalized system of inequality. Todd explains that this is the case in all stem 
family areas, despite the fact that often laws state that all children should inherit 
equally. Todd (1990a) claims that in these latter areas, classified as being dominated 
by ‘incomplete’ stem families, the strength of the primogeniture tradition tends to 
override any such egalitarian law-making. Finally, Todd terms a further category of 
family ‘communitarian’, where both familial authority and equality are strong. In 
areas dominated by this family type, married brothers remain living and working in 
the family home, under the authority of their father, but with the expectation of an 
equal inheritance.  
 
Table 1 summarizes the interaction between the equality and the authority dimension 
while Table 2 provides a summary of the main characteristics of these five family 
types that emerge. 
 
Importantly, Todd’s data is only available on a map (see Figure A1 in Appendix 1 for 
a translated version of Todd’s map) and he derives his conclusions from a simple 
visual comparison between his map of family structure and a series of economic,  
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Table 1. Family types defined by authority and equality 
 
 Egalitarian Non-egalitarian 
Strong authority Communitarian Stem (whether of an 
‘absolute’ or ‘incomplete’ 
nature) 
Weak authority Egalitarian nuclear 
 
 
Absolute nuclear 
 
 
Table 2. Main characteristics of family types 
 
Family type Main characteristics 
Absolute nuclear Total emancipation of children in adulthood to form 
independent families made simply of a couple and their 
children. Division of inheritance among children by testament 
or will, usually to a single individual, often the son. Brothers 
and sisters are treated as independent individuals (Todd, 
1990a: 37). 
Egalitarian nuclear Total emancipation of children in adulthood to form 
independent families made simply of a couple and their 
children. Equal division of inheritance among children. This 
system encourages the persistence of slightly stronger 
relations between parents and children until the inheritance is 
completely divided after the parents’ death (Todd, 1990a: 37-
38). 
Stem family Extended families with several generations living under one 
roof. One child – generally, but not always, the eldest – 
marries and has children that remain in the household in order 
to preserve the lineage. The rest have the choice of remaining 
unmarried within the household or of marrying and leaving 
the home or becoming soldiers or priests. The house and the 
land are inherited by the son who stays at home. Others may 
receive some financial compensation. The inheriting son, who 
stays at home, remains under the formal authority of the father 
(Todd, 1990a: 38). 
Incomplete stem 
family 
As above, but with more egalitarian inheritance rules (in 
principle, but rarely in practice). 
Communitarian 
family 
Extended family in which all sons can get married and bring 
their wives to the family home. Equality among children in 
inheritance, with family wealth and estates divided after the 
death of parent (although a period of cohabitation between 
married brothers after the death of the parents is possible) 
(Todd, 1990a: 39-40). 
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political, and social maps of Europe. Furthermore, the regions used by Todd (1990a) 
are often outdated administrative units. In some cases, like France, these units roughly 
correspond to current administrative divisions (even though a few French departments 
have been created in the last forty years) and are being used today by Eurostat (the 
main data provider at the European level) for other variables. In other cases, such as 
the UK, the administrative map of Todd (1990a) differs quite significantly from the 
current regional map. To retrieve Todd’s data on family structure, we first digitized 
his main summary map of family structures in Europe (1990a: 74). Then using GIS 
software (ArcInfo), we overlaid NUTS III European regions. These are the smallest 
regions at which data are broadly available in Europe. This operation required a 
careful adjustment of Todd’s original map which does not appear to have been 
generated by any standard projection. We then used ArcInfo to read for each NUTS 
III region which proportion of its area was attributed to each family type. At the 
NUTS III level (1031 regions for 14 countries), a large majority of regions are 
homogenous according to Todd’s classification. We also made two small corrections 
to Todd’s data. His original map puts the French region of Languedoc and the Spanish 
regions of Andalucía as indeterminate. However, his text indicates that Languedoc 
should be classified as incomplete stem and Andalucía as nuclear egalitarian.1 Finally, 
given the paucity of European data at the NUTS III level, we aggregated our data at 
the NUTS II level (where NUTS III regions were weighted proportionately to their 
land area).   
 
                                                 
1
 Our results are not sensitive to these two minor changes. 
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Figure 1 represents a mapped version of our final output2. It presents the geographic 
spread of the family types identified by Todd over Europe. It also shows a sixth 
category, ‘indeterminate’, where information is unavailable or where family types do 
not conform to the other categories, or where no single category dominates. As the 
map indicates, the absolute nuclear family was dominant in southern and eastern 
England, eastern Scotland, north west France, Holland and other coastal regions of the 
Netherlands, Denmark, and southern Norway. The absolute stem family prevailed in 
the west of the British Isles, northern Spain, south western France, much of Germany, 
Austria, and German-speaking Switzerland, as well as much of southern Sweden and 
coastal Finland. Egalitarian nuclear families were strongest in northern and eastern 
France, most of Spain, and southern and north-western Italy. As Todd has noted, the 
areas dominated by incomplete stem families lie on the borders between complete 
stem and egalitarian nuclear families, reflecting their mixture of egalitarian law, and 
non-egalitarian practices. These cover Belgium, Luxembourg, and large areas of the 
upper Rhine valley between Germany and France, as well as the regions of Poitou-
Charentes and Gironde in western France and Veneto and Trento in Italy. 
Communitarian families are relatively uncommon, occupying areas of central Italy 
and large parts of the interior of Finland.  
 
                                                 
2
 In order to create the adapted map presented in Figure 1, the following boundary datasets 
were used:  
- Continental Europe and Ireland: ESRI (2004). ‘Europe Basemap: Level 1 and 2 
Provinces’. In: ESRI Data & Maps–World, Europe, Canada, and Mexico (Level 1: 
Sweden, Luxemburg, Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Austria; Level 2: Finland, Portugal, 
Ireland, Belgium, Switzerland, France, Germany, Italy, Spain). 
- UK: Edina UKBORDERS (2004). English and Welsh Counties and Scottish Regions for 
1981 This is based on data provided through EDINA UKBORDERS with the support of 
the ESRC and JISC and uses boundary material (copyright of the Crown).  
- NUTS Regions in the EU: GISCO (2003). ‘Administrative/NUTS Regions: 
NUEC1MV7’. In: EU Boundaries CD Rom. Version 1. 
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Note that this map does not necessarily present current information. As already 
highlighted, some of these patterns seem to reflect very old historical divisions. 
Beyond the Etruscan and Celtic areas mentioned above, it is hard not to notice that 
regions where equality among siblings is prevalent tend to be core regions of the 
Western Roman Empire. In particular the border between equality and inequality in 
Northern France (which, interestingly, does not correspond to the French-Belgian 
border) closely approximates the historical border between French and Flemish–
speaking (or, for that sake, between Latin and Germanic-speaking) populations which 
dates back to Roman times. Importantly, this map of family structure does not appear 
to reflect an opposition between Northern and Southern Europe. Communitarian 
families are heavily concentrated in a few areas, whereas stem and nuclear families 
can be found nearly everywhere. Even more importantly, these family divisions do 
not coincide with national borders and most countries exhibit a high level of 
heterogeneity. France, for instance, contains nearly all types of families and no 
country considered in the analysis (except for Luxembourg) is entirely homogenous. 
This means that we will be able to identify the effects of medieval family structure 
and condition out national effects. This is important because even though family types 
do not solely reflect a North-South opposition (or any other geographic distinction), 
there might be some correlation between countries and family types (where, for 
instance, stem families seem to be over-represented in Northern Europe).  
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Figure 1. Family types in Europe. 
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2. The persistence of family types and their economic significance 
 
Although our information on family and kinship links and inheritance customs dates 
back, at least, to the Middle Ages, an underlying assumption of both Todd’s and our 
work is that these family types persist in some way to the present day. This 
persistence maybe direct, evidenced today perhaps by the relatively late age at which 
the offspring of Mediterranean families leave home compared to their northern 
European equivalents (Reher, 1998: 205). This form of persistence seems intuitively 
likely given the probability that children are brought up to consider their family 
traditions as proper and so recreate them with their own children. Alternatively, the 
persistence may develop through intermediate factors, such as the nature of political 
or economic institutions, shaped first by family structures and which, in turn, have 
continued to influence our society today in a path-dependant manner.  
 
However, a broad range of academic work in a variety of different fields either argues 
against these hypotheses or otherwise assumes that the persistence of family 
structures, whether direct or indirect, is not significant. For example, some of the most 
influential work on social capital, such as that of James Coleman (1988, 1990), 
assumes that highly developed social capital is a replacement for family structures 
which, as a result, have become an irrelevance. In this view, social capital is seen as 
more modern and beneficial than family structures and, once established, allows 
traditional family structures to wither away. Those who have studied the variety and 
influence of different family types have also used the idea of modernity and 
superseding institutions within the analysis of family types themselves. For example, 
Greif (2005, 2006) argues that nuclear families superseded other ‘kinship’ forms of 
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family structure as part of the modernization process throughout Europe, suggesting 
that while nuclear family types encouraged industrialization, so too did 
industrialization help to bring an end to non-nuclear forms of family (Greif, 2005: 3).3  
 
Overall, then, the idea that family types or institutions persist has been challenged in 
three different ways, each a description of one type of institution superseding another, 
as summarized in Table 3: 
 
Table 3. Superseding institutions 
 
Original institution Superseding institution Associated authors 
Family Social Capital James Coleman (1988, 1990) 
Community Society Max Weber (1921) 
Kinship families Nuclear families Avner Greif (2005) 
 
Demographers, however, are less confident that nuclear families have spread so 
rapidly as a result of industrialization, and, indeed, regard this view as something of a 
myth. Scott Smith (1993), for example, claims that demographers have argued 
consistently that the most notable thing about family structures was not their 
changing, but their constancy over centuries. He notes that economists as far back as 
Alfred Marshall and Adam Smith have used family structure to help explain 
disparities in economic growth and development (Scott Smith, 1993: 7), while 
pointing out that few demographers have disagreed with them since. Anstone et al 
(1999) also criticize those who have written about social capital without paying 
attention to the work of demographers, remarking directly on the work of Coleman, 
for example:  
 
                                                 
3
 Indeed, Greif argues that the domination of Europe by the nuclear family was underway as 
early as the 8th century (Greif, 2005: 3). 
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“We disagree with Coleman’s assessment of the declining importance of the family in industrialized 
societies, and we argue that family formation is among the most important types of investment in social 
capital made in all societies. On this basis we contend that sociologists and other social scientists 
interested in social capital would do well to attend to the substantive findings of family demographers.” 
(Anstone et al 1999: 5) 
 
The essence of the demographers’ approach, as expressed by Anstone et al (1999) is 
that family structure is the origin and shaper of social capital and is built upon rather 
than superseded. Family structures may become internalized and reproduce 
themselves through communitarian interpersonal networks (Portes, 1998), for 
example, or through repeated behavior within communities that ends up embedding 
cultural norms and values, leaving an indelible imprint across society (Hofstede, 
1980). Reher (1998) describes how family structures might directly reproduce 
themselves, even in the face of significant social upheaval: 
 
“Regardless of their historical origins, attitudes toward the family and the individual make up the cultural tapestry 
of societies, and thus they are models that are learned at a very young age and that societies – individuals, families, 
institutions – help perpetuate. Learning these behaviour patterns is the cornerstone of the socialization of children. 
They are attitudes shared by the society as a whole. Perhaps because of this, they have been so resistant to the 
otherwise corrosive effects of economic, political, social and demographic modernization. Even though the 
changes of this past century have tended to make cultures and mentalities more uniform, they have done little to 
erase the historic profiles of family systems in Europe” (Reher, 1998: 215) 4 
 
If the differences between family structures that were identified by Todd do indeed 
persist to the present then they may have a variety of economic impacts, which may 
                                                 
4
 Reher goes on to argue that while the historical persistence of family structures is 
significant, the distinctions between stem and nuclear, and egalitarian and hierarchical are 
unnecessary. Instead, a simpler distinction between weak family ties in northern Europe and 
strong family ties in southern Europe is all that is deemed necessary to explain the significant 
differences between the two areas (Reher, 1998: 221). As will be seen, our results have some 
bearing on this debate. 
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help to explain current regional disparities and the difficulties of reducing them. Both 
Todd (1990a, 1990b,) and Greif (2005) have attributed to family structures an 
extremely influential role in the European industrial revolutions and subsequent 
economic growth. For example, it has been argued that the relative independence of 
the children of nuclear families, and their habit of leaving home early in pursuit of 
economic opportunities, made them a far more likely proletarian workforce compared 
to the offspring of communitarian or stem families. The latter were much less inclined 
to move away from the family to new cities or factories and may have thus favored 
the persistence of agricultural practices (Todd, 1991: 38). The lack of any future 
inheritance for the majority of children in inegalitarian family areas may have also 
spurred the need to educate and train, in contrast to regions with more egalitarian 
traditions. Todd uses this argument as part of his explanation of how the absolute 
nuclear dominated north western part of France adapted to the crises of heavy 
industry in the 1970s by shifting to different types of production, more effectively 
than other areas of France (1991: 144). This ability is seen as a reflection of the 
dynamism and adaptability engendered by the independence and drive of those 
brought up within the absolute nuclear tradition. In general, the increased mobility of 
people in absolute nuclear dominated areas could also be used to help explain either 
greater entrepreneurial capacity or lower levels of structural unemployment.  
 
On the other hand, the significance of family structures in the much-discussed success 
of interlinked small family firms in the Third Italy (Becattini, 1987; Storper, 1997: 
137-146), for example, offers one way in which close knit, communitarian family 
structures can hold advantages over looser, nuclear family types. Stem families, too, 
may have some advantages in certain economic and historical conditions. The inbuilt 
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inequality associated with this family structure may lead to concentrations of capital 
or land that would facilitate, or create the appropriate incentives for, the investment 
required for leaps in industrial development. It could also be argued that, while the 
offspring of nuclear families are more mobile, the offspring of stem families are more 
likely to work efficiently within the authoritarian labor systems of mass production. 
Overall, these various advantages and disadvantages of family types in terms of their 
suitability for various types of economic development may make it possible to 
construct a historical narrative in which different family types turn out to be more 
efficient at different times. While stem family dominated areas maybe to the fore in 
times of industrial mass production, nuclear family dominated areas may be better off 
when, as now, an economic context calls for adaptability and entrepreneurialism. 
 
As suggested above, however, the influence of family structures might also persist 
through intermediate factors, even if the original nature of the family has since 
changed (perhaps, for example, becoming homogenously nuclear throughout Europe, 
in Greif’s (2005) view). For example, it might initially be argued, following Greif 
(2005), that nuclear family dominated regions were more likely to develop formal 
associations, or ‘corporations’, whereas stem family dominated areas were prone to 
informal community type institutions within which transactions and agreements were 
framed. It might then be hypothesized that even if the nuclear family type spread 
across Europe, superseding all other types of family, the institutions that had 
originally been shaped in different ways by family structures had become resistant to 
further change, persisted to the present day and so continue to shape economic 
outcomes.  
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We return to discuss these and other theories more thoroughly in the light of our 
results, below. This paper does not claim to address the question of whether family 
structures persist directly or indirectly through intermediate factors. Our hypothesis 
and results simply address the question of whether or not the influence of family 
structures persists in some way. Neither do we address whether family types are the 
primary cause or symptoms (or a first order outcome) of deeper historical, cultural or 
even geographical determinants that might shape either the nature of family structures 
themselves, or both family structure and other effects correlated with it. For example, 
even if links were confirmed between nuclear families and higher levels of social 
capital, the correlation might be the result of a shared, fundamental cause, such as 
levels of assimilation into the Roman Empire, or the practice of certain pre-Christian 
religions, rather than any direct causal relationship between the variables. Further 
analysis in this area can be found in the work of Mamadouh (1999) or Tabellini 
(2005), while the nature of the potential causative links between the variables is 
discussed in more detail in the results section, below.  
 
3. The model 
 
Our starting hypothesis is that medieval family types – either directly, through their 
survival over time, or indirectly, through their internalization in values, customs, and 
culture – are strongly associated with current regional disparities across Europe in the 
areas we are considering. The disparities in question have dictated our dependent 
variables and fall into several categories. We study demographic data in terms of 
average family size in 2000 and also with regard to educational attainment, measured 
by the percentages of the population with education up to primary and beyond 
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secondary level in 1997. We also measure labor force participation in terms of overall 
and female employment; social capital in terms of memberships of clubs and the 
percentage of people who meet with friends at least once a week; and sectoral 
structure by using the percentages of employment in manufacturing and services. 
Finally, we examine economic conditions and performance using GDP per capita in 
2004, GDP growth between 1975 and 2004 and inequality as measured by Gini 
coefficients in 2004 (Table 4). These variables have been selected as a result of their 
potential relevance to current debates surrounding regional disparities in Europe. By 
selecting a wide range of indicators, representing demographic, social, and economic 
fields of study we hope to offer a set of similarly broad conclusions, while identifying 
which factors are affected by which aspects of family type.  
Table 4: Dependent variables and sources 
 
Factor Variable Source 
Demographic 
structure 
 
 
• Average household size 
in 2000, measured in 
number of individuals per 
household 
• European 
Community 
Household Panel 
(ECHP) 
Educational 
attainment 
• Percentage of the 
population with education 
beyond secondary level 
in 1997  
• EUROSTAT 
 
 
 
Labor force 
 participation 
 
• Employment levels in 
2003, as a percentage of 
the total adult population  
• Female participation in 
2003, as a percentage of 
the total adult population  
• EUROSTAT 
 
 
• EUROSTAT 
 
Social capital 
 
• Membership of clubs in 
2000, as a percentage of 
the population included 
in the sample  
• Percentage of people who 
meet with friends at least 
once a week in 2000, as a 
percentage of the 
population included in 
the sample  
• ECHP 
 
 
 
• ECHP 
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Sectoral structure 
 
• Percentage of 
employment in 
manufacturing in 2003  
• Percentage of 
employment in services 
in 2003  
• EUROSTAT 
 
 
• EUROSTAT 
 
Economic 
performance 
 
 
• GDP per head in 2004, 
measured in constant 
Euros (base 1995) 
• Personal Gini coefficient, 
measuring inequality in 
income per capita in 2000  
• Growth of GDP per 
capita 1975-2004, 
measured in constant 
Euros (base 1995)  
• Cambridge 
Econometrics 
 
• ECHP 
 
 
• Cambridge 
Econometrics 
 
 
 
Our simple OLS model adopts the following form: 
y = α+ iF1β + iND2β +  εi 
where:  
y represents the dependent variables included in Table 4; 
Fi is the dominant family type in region i. Six family types corresponding to Todd’s 
classification as described above are used: 
 F1: Absolute nuclear 
 F2: Egalitarian nuclear  
 F3: Stem family 
 F4: Incomplete stem family 
 F5: Communitarian family 
 F6: Undetermined family types; 
 NDi are national dummies, used to capture the effect of nationally defined factors on 
the dependent variables. F1, the absolute nuclear family and France are used as the 
family type and country of reference, and therefore not included in the regression 
analysis. All coefficients then can be interpreted as relative to the family type and 
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country of reference.5 Finally ß1 and ß2 are the regression coefficients and ε is the 
error term.  
 
The territorial unit of analysis is made of 190 European NUTS II regions. Note that 
the national dummies play an important role in this regression. On the one hand, they 
ensure that the coefficient on family types does not pick up national effects. On the 
other hand, they capture the effects of family types to the extent that a dominant 
family type in a country will affect the outcomes for this country through for instance 
its national institutions. In this respect, Todd (1990b) argues that French institutions 
tend to reflect nuclear egalitarian values that come from the greater Paris region. This 
implies that our coefficients on family types probably under-estimate the association 
between family types and regional outcomes.  
 
The results of the analysis are presented in Table 56.  
                                                 
5
 The choice of the absolute nuclear family as our base category, is motivated by a) the 
general belief that nuclear types are now the dominant forms of family structure (Greif, 2005 
and 2006) and b) by the perception of absolute families as the most adequate family structure 
for the promotion of innovation, adaptability, and economic progress (Todd, 1991; Greif, 
2005). 
6
 We do not control for spatial autocorrelation, as it is unclear, from a theoretical perspective, 
whether we could expect spillovers in this case. Were we to find some positive effects of the 
neighboring regions’ family types on regional performance, it is unlikely that family types 
would be the key factor behind that spatial dependency, as they could be masking other 
factors, such as market potential effects. In any case, the risk of spatial dependence in this 
case is either limited in space (Rodríguez-Pose and Crescenzi, 2008) and can be regarded as a 
secondary concern in comparison with specification issues (Briant et al., 2008).  
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Family types 
  
Average household 
size 
Education beyond 
secondary level 
Percentage 
working in total 
population 
Ratio of women to 
men in working 
population 
Membership of clubs 
 
Meeting friends once 
a week 
0.157* -3.289* -0.022* -0.038* -0.065*** -0.007 Egalitarian nuclear 
  0.084 1.778 0.012 0.022 0.017 0.024 
0.011 -2.545** -0.015* 0.003 -0.025** 0.022 Stem  
  0.058 1.237 0.008 0.015 0.012 0.016 
0.196** -4.468** -0.008 -0.009 0.010 0.031 Incomplete stem 
  0.086 1.832 0.0125 0.023 0.018 0.025 
0.061 -3.147 -0.007 0.038 -0.042 0.028 Communitarian 
  0.127 2.536 0.017 0.031 0.026 0.036 
0.062 1.132 -0.046*** 0.017 -0.064*** -0.129*** Undetermined 
  0.083 1.683 0.011 0.021 0.017 0.024 
 National dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
df 15, 151 17,171 18,171 18,171 15, 151 15, 151 
Number of obs 167 189 190 190 167 167 
F 32.76 23.22 16.92 22.74 85.59 136.65 
R-squared 0.77 0.70 0.64 0.71 0.89 0.93 
Adj R-squared 0.74 0.67 0.60 0.67 0.88 0.92 
 
Family types 
  
Employment in 
manufacturing 
Employment in services GDP per capita Personal gini coefficient Growth of GDP (1975-
2004) 
 
0.031 -0.041 -5122.8*** 0.002 -0.295* Egalitarian nuclear 
  0.024 0.027 1910.5 0.014 0.204 
0.029* -0.036* -2848.4** -0.005 -0.249* Stem  
  0.017 0.019 1329.3 0.009 0.142 
0.0765*** -0.074*** -3981.7** -0.024* -0.455** Incomplete stem 
  0.0245 0.028 1968.2 0.014 0.211 
0.114*** -0.110*** -5172.9* -0.040** -0.060 Communitarian 
  0.034 0.039 2724.5 0.021 0.292 
-0.004 -0.005 -9380.0*** -0.070*** -0.515** Undetermined 
  0.023 0.026 1807.8 0.013 0.237 
 National dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
df 17,170 17,170 18,171 15,151 18,162 
Number of obs 188 188 190 167 181 
F 3.67 6.27 11.63 35.02 18.85 
R-squared 0.27 0.39 0.55 0.78 0.68 
Adj R-squared 0.20 0.32 0.50 0.75 0.64 
Notes: 
Coefficients relative to those of absolute nuclear families 
Standard errors in italics below coefficients 
***,**,* denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level respectively 
 
Table 5. Summary of Results
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4. Family types and regional disparities in Europe 
 
The main result that emerges from Table 5 is the favorable position of absolute 
nuclear families, in comparison to all of the other five family types, with regard to 
current levels of GDP. Areas where absolute nuclear families dominate, or have 
dominated in the past, also have higher levels of inequality than regions of stem 
incomplete, communitarian, or indeterminate family type traditions (although the 
difference with either egalitarian nuclear or absolute stem family areas is not 
statistically significant). Recent growth in GDP has also been higher in absolute 
nuclear areas compared to both types of stem family, egalitarian nuclear, and 
indeterminate areas, but not compared to communitarian regions. The employment 
data also provides some striking differences. Once again, absolute nuclear families 
show better results than three other types of areas (those dominated by egalitarian 
nuclear, absolute stem, and undetermined families), while showing no difference with 
either communitarian or incomplete stem areas.  
 
There appears to be a clear dividing line between nuclear families, on the one hand, 
and stem and communitarian families, on the other, with regard to employment. 
Employment in nuclear family dominated areas is more likely to be in services, while 
employment in stem or communitarian areas is more strongly linked to 
manufacturing. One social capital indicator is notable, showing that the people in 
egalitarian nuclear, absolute stem, and indeterminate family areas are less likely to 
have joined clubs or associations. The other social capital indicator is notable only in 
that our national dummies appear to be of much greater relevance than family type. 
Finally, demographic and educational data also isolates absolute nuclear family areas. 
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These areas typically have smaller households than egalitarian nuclear or stem 
incomplete family areas, and have a greater proportion of people educated to 
university level than absolute nuclear families, while communitarian and 
indeterminate areas are similar to absolute nuclear families with regard to both 
indicators. 
 
In general, our results appear to confirm that medieval family types in Europe have a 
significant and strong association with current regional disparities in household size, 
educational attainment, social capital, labor participation, sectoral structure, as well as 
with wealth and inequality. There are four main causal paths which could potentially 
account for these associations. First, family structures might persist to the present and 
continue to directly affect economic outcomes. Second, family structures may have 
caused changes in the past to other institutions, which in turn have caused the current 
disparities we observe today. Third, reverse causation is also plausible: that 
differences in economic and institutional factors across regions have themselves 
caused the variation in family structures. The fact that the industrial revolution took 
place first in England, for example, may have caused that country’s families to 
establish, or strengthen its ‘nuclear’ traditions. It would also be a simple matter to 
combine these two directions of causation within hypotheses based on bi-directional, 
or circular causation. Fourth, as mentioned above, a further possibility is that family 
structures are merely an outcome of a deeper, underlying determinant (such as 
religion or culture), which might represent the true cause of the variations we observe. 
In this case, family structures would be endogenous to the causal process and of little 
explanatory value. The first two types of causation described above are the main focus 
of the analysis below, with discussion of reverse and circular causation where 
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relevant. However, proving or eliminating the fourth possibility, by establishing 
empirically if both family structures and its correlates are outcomes of some other 
common cause, would require further testing and, while it may be the subject of a 
future paper, it is beyond the scope of this one.  
 
Theories regarding similar associations between family structures and economic and 
social indicators have already been investigated by Todd (1990a, 1990b, 1991), and 
those who have followed him (Mamadouh, 1999; Schultenover, 1999; Berry, 2000) 
and provide a framework within which our own hypotheses can be developed. The 
persistence in Europe of family structures throughout the last two millennia has been 
used in the past to help explain, for example, the relative levels of welcome or 
resistance to tides of change such as Protestantism and secularism (Todd, 1990a and 
1990b; Schultenover, 1999), political culture in general (Todd, 1990a and 1990b; 
Mamadouh, 1999), and specifically economic processes such as industrialization and 
modernization (Todd 1990a, 1990b). Some of these theories have already been 
mentioned in section 3 above and offer an excellent starting point for much of our 
analysis. 
 
Our clearest and most significant results appear to suggest that areas dominated by 
absolute nuclear families generally enjoy an advantage in terms of GDP per capita 
over every other type of region. Once the national effect is controlled for, regions with 
an absolute nuclear family tradition had in 2004 a GDP per head which was on 
average close to 3,000 euros higher than in areas with a stem family tradition; close to 
4,000 euros higher than in incomplete stem regions; more than 5,000 euros higher 
than in egalitarian nuclear or a communitarian dominated areas; and more than 9,000 
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euros than in indeterminate areas (Table 5). These regions have also enjoyed better 
recent GDP growth compared to stem family dominated areas. Between 1975 and 
2004 the growth of GDP per capita in areas with a tradition of absolute nuclear 
families outstripped that of egalitarian nuclear, stem, and indeterminate family 
traditions by between 13 and 15 per cent, and that of incomplete stem family types by 
close to 20 per cent. Only communitarian family tradition areas kept up with absolute 
nuclear areas in terms of recent economic growth (Table 5). It would be tempting to 
draw some simple conclusions regarding this correlation, and argue that the absolute 
nuclear family structure is better suited to economic development. However, one need 
only reflect on the difficulty of defending this position in the late 1970s, when the UK 
was considered the ‘sick man of Europe’ despite the dominance of the absolute 
nuclear family form, to understand that no such simple conclusion is available. 
Different countries have led European economic development at different times, and 
at no time since the 1870s has it been possible to argue that the stem family 
dominated area of Germany, for example, has been economically backward.  
 
It is possible to build a more subtle and powerful explanation of how family types 
may influence economic development, using some of the arguments already described 
in section 2.1 above. First, the nuclear family’s tradition of emancipation increases 
potential for movement away from the family home which can facilitate the pursuit of 
independent economic opportunities. Second, the inability to rely on the family for 
income and housing could be said to generate a more entrepreneurial spirit of self-
reliance, as well as greater motivation to work. Third, in absolute nuclear families, the 
principles of primogeniture may exaggerate these first two tendencies still further, as 
non-inheriting children are left even more reliant on their own initiative. As a result, 
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we would expect the offspring of absolute nuclear families to move further, faster, and 
take greater risks in order to take advantage of economic opportunities, especially in 
times of structural economic adjustment.  
 
To take a concrete example of this type of argument, let us consider Todd’s analysis 
of the stark economic and sectoral divides within France (Todd, 1991: 38). He argues 
that, in the 19th century, the creation of an industrial workforce was only possible in 
the nuclear family dominated north, as the offspring of southern stem families were 
unwilling to uproot themselves away from the family home to work in urban factories. 
Todd also suggests that the difference between egalitarian nuclear and absolute 
nuclear families may account for the differences in economic dynamism between 
north eastern and north western France, as western Europe adjusted from 
manufacturing to service economies in the later 20th century. He argues that the 
current areas of decline and structural unemployment in egalitarian nuclear north 
eastern France compare unfavorably to the dynamism and flexibility of both north 
western France and England, where the economy has adjusted more successfully. The 
lack of adaptability and dynamism, it is argued, is related to the relative lack of 
pressure on the offspring of egalitarian families, due to their expectations of 
inheritance. The statistically significant correlations between absolute nuclear families 
and GDP, recent growth and inequality would all appear to support these 
interpretations. 
 
Our results concerning the proportion of the working population in the industrial and 
service sectors demonstrate what appears to be a clear dividing line between stem and 
communitarian families, on the one hand, and nuclear families, on the other. While in 
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2003 communitarian family dominated areas had a share of employment in 
manufacturing that was more than 11 points higher than in absolute nuclear family 
type regions and incomplete stem and stem areas were 7.6 and 3 points higher, 
respectively, than absolute nuclear areas, the roles were reversed when employment in 
services was considered. In this category, the differences were of 3.6 points with 
respect to stem family areas, 7.3 with respect to incomplete stem, and 11 points with 
respect to communitarian family dominated regions, always in favor of absolute 
nuclear regions (Table 5). Given the hypothesis that absolute nuclear families should 
be more able to adapt to new economic structures, we would expect these regions to 
reflect a more modern sectoral balance, which very much appears to be the case. It 
could be argued that the nuclear areas industrialized first, grew faster and are now 
further along the path of modernization having transformed more quickly and fully 
into service societies. However, while the absolute nuclear dominated UK did indeed 
industrialize first, there are many instances of stem dominated areas industrializing 
before other absolute nuclear areas and it would therefore be unwise to attribute 
industrial take-off or economic development in general, solely to family structure.  
 
A finer version of this story could be developed by returning to the discussion 
regarding dynamism, flexibility, and entrepreneurialism. Rather than simply being 
‘further ahead’, the offspring of absolute nuclear families, being less dependent on 
their families and more entrepreneurial in spirit, are more likely to be able to adapt, 
move or change in response to any given economic change or sectoral shift. That is to 
acknowledge that, while many factors exogenous to family structure are likely to be 
the cause of major economic changes, family structure itself may be a key 
determinant of the ability to adapt to those changes. Having made a similar argument 
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about north western and north eastern France, Todd adds (1991: 150) that areas where 
the numbers working in services increased also saw increases in the numbers working 
in industry, too. This would appear to strengthen our interpretation that absolute 
nuclear areas may simply be more adaptable regardless of the circumstances, rather 
than merely ‘ahead’ in terms of the transition from industry to service based 
economies. 
 
The advantage of this view is that it takes account of the obvious fact that other 
factors apart from family structure may produce economic change. That is to say that 
even when family structure is not the fundamental cause of change, it can determine 
how a region might react to a wave of change caused by something else. A key part of 
this adaptability may lie in the availability and nature of social capital, and here again 
our results can be used to support our general hypothesis. The results in Table 5 
suggest that the offspring of absolute nuclear families are amongst the most likely to 
form associations and join clubs. One possible reason for this is that they are less able 
to depend on their families for support and so must form other networks in order to 
compensate. As these are built amongst people who do not necessarily have kinship 
ties, they have both greater potential for expansion, and are also more likely to have 
formal rules and hence greater transparency. As a result, they may be more efficient 
and conducive to growth. Greif (2005) suggests something closely related to this 
when describing how nuclear families, in medieval times, facilitated the establishment 
and growth of what he calls ‘corporations’7: 
 
                                                 
7
 Defined as “intentionally created, voluntary, interest-based, and self-governed permanent 
institutions” (Greif, 2005: 1) 
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For an individual, corporations reduce the benefits from belonging to a kinship group [non-nuclear 
family structure] while a nuclear family increases the benefits from being a member of a corporation 
(Greif 2005: 1-2) 
 
Thus, Greif presents a virtuous circle whereby causation works in both directions – 
nuclear families providing encouragement for the establishment of corporations, and 
the related economic and social transformation encouraging the domination of the 
nuclear family across Europe. Greif goes on to reflect that nuclear families seem to 
encourage both flexibility and independence, and that societal institutions are 
developed in part as a response to the lack of safety net or associational benefits that 
are provided by non-nuclear family types. The growth of corporations is then used to 
help explain why the British monarchy had its influence limited, and the interests of 
the merchant class began to have more significance. This is a familiar argument and 
reminiscent of Acemoglu et al’s (2001, 2005) view of economic and political 
development. The link between nuclear families, the lack of informal social safety 
nets, and the rise of compensating institutions is also supported by accounts of the 
birth of the welfare state in the UK. Richard Smith (1996) traces the history of the 
welfare state back to the Poor Laws of 1601, which was revised and reformed 
throughout it 400 subsequent year history, and argues that its existence owed much to 
the structure of English families, which we define here as ‘nuclear’. 
 
However, the plausibility of reverse causation, suggested by Greif’s account, whereby 
the modern economy acts to spread the prevalence of the nuclear family, requires 
further attention. While Greif’s argument proposes that causation runs both ways, it 
could be argued that the most significant causal explanations of the correlations 
described here between family structure types and economic changes and disparities 
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are those that run from the latter to the former. If this were the case, then much of the 
explanation in the pages above would lose its value. For example, the correlation 
between nuclear families and early participation in the industrial revolution may be 
the result of the industrial revolution pulling children away from families at an earlier 
age, and encouraging them to travel further. This version of the causative link might 
see the existence of stem family dominated areas in western Britain, Ireland, and 
southern Europe as the result of the fact that industrialization happened later and less 
dramatically in these areas. Plausibly, it could be argued that recent economic booms 
in Spain and Ireland will help complete the process of change from stem to nuclear 
families, as children leave home earlier and travel further in pursuit of greater 
economic opportunities elsewhere. In a similar vein, it is possible to argue that the 
correlations between education and absolute nuclear families indicate that improved 
education frees children from dependency on their parents, rather than the idea that 
absolute nuclear families promote higher education to facilitate their offspring’s 
independence. 
  
However, there are several reasons not to dismiss the causative role of family 
structure in the correlations we have observed. First, it can be argued that the 
differences in family structure are of an older and more permanent nature than the 
differences in economic outcomes that we have attributed partly to them. Todd 
established the distinct patterns of family structure from records dating back to a time 
long before the industrial revolution. As a result, it is difficult to attribute the 
establishment of distinct family structures to economic developments in the modern 
era. Second, while it is very likely that industrial development has impacted upon all 
family structures and helped create a convergence towards the ‘absolute nuclear’ type, 
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this in no way precludes the significance or the plausibility of nuclear, liberal family 
types helping to provide the conditions in which industrialization could take off in the 
first place. Third, current regional disparities, such as the structural changes towards 
the service sector, continue to develop in correlation to family structure patterns, 
despite the fact that the revolutions in industry, technology, and universal education 
have spread more or less evenly throughout Europe. The norms, social rules, and 
conventions that affect socio-economic disparities could – using Binmore’s (2005) 
‘cultural evolution’ framework – be transmitted from generation to generation, via 
persuasion and emulation, directly using instruments such as family types, or 
indirectly through the reproduction of these family types in other institutions. 
 
While the reverse causation from economic or other social changes to family structure 
change is of obvious and undeniable importance, it complements rather than 
contradicts our general hypothesis; as Greif suggests, both directions of causation 
probably interact in a self-reinforcing manner. 
 
The position of social capital in this account also has potential for controversy. 
Whereas Greif (2005) and others (Coleman 1988, 1990) have seen the growth of 
social capital as replacing family structures throughout Europe, it maybe possible to 
argue that absolute nuclear family structures have merely allowed the formation of a 
particular sort of social capital in certain regions which did not become so prevalent 
elsewhere. This view is certainly supported by the results in terms of egalitarian 
nuclear and absolute stem families, but not in the cases of incomplete stem family or 
communitarian dominated areas. The persistence of strong family relations, at least 
until the death of the parents, in nuclear egalitarian family dominated areas, such as 
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southern Italy or central and southern Spain, has been argued to act as a hindrance in 
the development of fully-fledged societal institutional systems and, eventually, as a 
barrier to economic development (compare Banfield, 1957 or Trigilia, 1992, for the 
case of the Italian Mezzogiorno). The measurement of social interaction with friends, 
however, shows virtually no correlation with our categories – and the national 
dummies indicate that this is determined much more by national habits than family 
structure.  
 
Associations between education and household size might also be used to support our 
general hypothesis. The results in Table 5 indicate that the offspring of absolute 
nuclear families are more likely to be educated beyond secondary level. Education can 
also be linked exogenously to absolute family structures by arguing that, if one cannot 
depend on either the support of one’s family or on an inheritance, then there is a 
greater motivation to ensure you are educated and able to take advantage of whatever 
economic opportunities are presented. This might also be linked to household size, by 
pointing out that two of the three family types that have lower levels of post-
secondary education (egalitarian nuclear and stem incomplete) also tend to generate 
larger households. As such, it may be possible to argue that smaller family size, and 
therefore greater concentration of resources makes it easier for absolute nuclear 
families to send their children to university (Becker, 1960). Indeed, Todd (1991) has 
argued that inegalitarian families are likely to be smaller than egalitarian ones, as it is 
more difficult to see more children settled when only one child receives the bulk of 
the inheritance. The results offer support for this view. 
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Our general employment indicator suggests little directly, hinting merely at the 
overall superior economic performance of the absolute nuclear areas. This fits the 
overall story of the generally advantageous position of absolute nuclear areas, and 
also supports Reher’s (1998: 216) theory that, in general, areas around the 
Mediterranean (dominated by egalitarian nuclear and stem absolute family types) 
have a higher rate of unemployment, related in part to the greater ability of the family 
to provide support. As with many other social (as opposed to economic) indicators 
there is also difference between egalitarian and absolute nuclear in terms of the ratio 
of women in the workforce. In this case we note that our findings concur with the 
view that women are more likely to enter and/or remain in the workforce when they 
have fewer children (Wong and Levine, 1992) – supported tentatively by the 
correlation in our data between average household size and this ratio. 
 
The final indicator to be considered shows that areas with an absolute nuclear family 
tradition have greater inequality than indeterminate, communitarian, and incomplete 
stem areas. There is no significant difference, however, between absolute nuclear and 
either egalitarian nuclear or absolute stem families. Given our argument so far, and its 
support of the traditional views of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ and continental models, the 
higher level of inequality in absolute nuclear areas is perhaps unsurprising. It is also to 
be expected, perhaps, that the inegalitarian absolute stem families do not show a 
marked difference. However, the lack of any statistically significant difference 
between absolute nuclear and egalitarian nuclear areas in this regard is rather 
surprising. It could be hypothesized that in the latter case, the source of inequality 
might be from higher structural unemployment due to stagnation rather than from 
economic dynamism, but this is clearly only the most tentative of suggestions.  
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To summarize the identified characteristics of each family type, we can suggest the 
following:  
 
Regions with absolute nuclear families tend to be associated with smaller 
households, a more educated population, and a higher percentage of population in 
employment. As a rule, they have higher levels of formal club membership, perhaps 
as a form of compensation for the lack of socialization within the family. They are 
generally associated with service societies and tend to have richer and more dynamic 
regions, although also more inequitable societies. Regions with an imprint of absolute 
nuclear families seem to be early adopters, first in terms of the transition between an 
agricultural and an industrial society and then from the industrial to the service 
society. It thus may be that the higher economic dynamism of these areas is most in 
evidence in periods of change and less so in periods of stability. 
 
Regions where egalitarian nuclear families tended to predominate have larger 
households, lower overall levels of educated population, lower activity rates, and 
lower female participation in the labor force. A small but more universally available 
inheritance maybe seen as a deterrent for higher education, as would the larger family 
size. While there is no big difference with absolute nuclear family areas in terms of 
sectoral structure, inequality, and dynamism, these regions tend to be poorer, perhaps 
as a result of their weaker ability to adapt to sectoral shifts in the economy. 
 
Regions with a tradition of stem families seem to be associated with larger 
household size, lower levels of education, and lower participation in the labor force, 
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but not necessarily lower female participation. They are currently predominantly 
industrial societies and tend to be poorer and less dynamic than nuclear family 
dominated areas, especially in times of structural change.  
 
Regions with communitarian family traditions are surprisingly not linked to bigger 
households, or less educated populations, or less overall participation in the 
workforce. Such regions tend to be manufacturing societies and poorer, but more 
equal, than areas of absolute nuclear family traditions.  
 
A potential criticism of these results relates to the focus on family structure as the sole 
explanatory variable, while omitting a host of other variables that may have an 
influence on our independent variables. Differences in wealth, economic growth, 
family size, education, employment levels, or female participation may be the 
consequence of a host of factors that go beyond family structures and no explanatory 
variable is completely robust against the addition of extra variables (Sala-i-Martín et 
al, 2004). In fact, most of our dependent variables could be used as independent 
variables to explain, say, differences in wealth or economic growth. Education, labor 
force participation, or sectoral structure, for example, are generally regarded as key 
determinants of growth. There are, however, several reasons that have motivated us to 
overlook what can be considered as ‘proximate’ (e.g. education, sectoral structure, 
employment) rather than ‘deep’ (e.g. family structures) causes of regional disparities. 
First comes the fact that the problems of endogeneity mentioned earlier are more 
prone to exist with the use of ‘proximate’ factors. It is more likely for recent 
economic growth to affect employment levels, female participation, or education than 
regional family structure traditions. Second, other ‘proximate’ causes may, in turn, 
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reflect  ‘deeper’ factors. Finally, when regressing family structures together with other 
‘proximate’ factors, such as demographic structure, education, labor force 
participation, social capital, or sectoral structure on economic performance, the family 
structure factors are more robust than any of the ‘proximate factors’.8 
 
But what about other ‘deep’ factors that may influence existing regional disparities in 
Europe? It is true that other ‘deep’ factors, such as history, culture, or religion, may 
affect regional change and disparities. However, the introduction of country effects 
controls for a large amount of the variation potentially caused by national institutions. 
In addition, the use of other ‘deep’ historical or institutional factors may create 
problems, as we expect history or institutions to affect families, but also for families 
to become a channel for the transmission of history and institutions. Consider the case 
of religion, whose current geographical distribution took place later than the 
formation of family structures used in this paper. Family structures may have been 
one of the factors shaping the diffusion of Protestantism after the Reform, while the 
establishment of Protestantism may have, to a certain extent, affected family 
structures. When we include family structures and religion together in one regression 
as a means to explain current disparities in two of our dependent variables (regional 
wealth and economic growth)9 (Table 6), we find that while the coefficients of the 
different family structures are barely affected with respect to those reported on Table 
                                                 
8
 Results of these regressions can be provided upon request. 
 
9
 Regions are classified into regions with a Catholic, Protestant, or Anglican majority, 
depending on the main religion of the population. Regions with a Protestant majority are used 
as the base category. The sources of data are http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook; 
http://commons.wikimidia.org/wiki/Image:Europe_religion_map_de.png; and http://csi-
int.org/world_map_europa_religion.php.   
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5, the religious characteristics of regions tend to be dissociated from either current 
levels of wealth or recent economic performance. The sole exception is the higher 
performance of regions with a Catholic majority during the last three decades, as a 
consequence of the higher recent dynamism of regions in Ireland, Spain or of the 
Italian regions during the 1980s. 
 
Table 6. Family types vs. religion 
 
Independent variables GDP per capita Growth of GDP (1975-2004) 
-5329.9*** -0.375* Egalitarian nuclear 
1955.9 0.206 
-2992,6** -0.289** Stem 
1365.7 0.143 
-4390.6** -0.642*** Incomplete stem 
2118.3 0.222 
-5410.7* -0.152 Communitarian 
2770.9 0.291 
-9430.5*** -0.548** 
Fa
m
ily
 
ty
pe
s 
Undetermined 
1856.5 0.240 
712.8  0.416**  Mainly Catholic 
1570.2  0.167  
-713.1  -0.055  R
el
ig
io
n
 
Mainly Anglican 
2910.5  0.231  
National dummies Included Included 
df 20,169 20,160 
Number of obs 189 180 
F 10.30 17.72 
R-squared 0.55 0.83 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Adj R-squared 0.50 0.69 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The arguments put forward above indicate that the links between family structure and 
socio-economic outcomes deserve attention and may offer significant progress 
towards understanding why some regions are richer, have different levels of social 
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capital, are more able to adapt to sectoral shifts, or are more unequal than others. This 
is the case whether or not stem and communitarian families in the areas in which 
Todd identified them still remain or have been replaced by nuclear families; what is 
clear is that at least some associations seem to persist, and that these links have rich 
explanatory potential. While settling the controversies regarding the direction and 
nature of the causal processes involved is beyond the scope of this paper, our most 
plausible hypotheses all suggest some causative influence flowing from family 
structure to the persistence of disparities in social and economic development across 
Europe. It is also worth noting that these results would seem to suggest that Reher’s 
(1998) criticism regarding the over-complexity of Todd’s classification is misplaced, 
as we can see that significant differences emerge not just between northern and 
southern Europe, but also along the lines of authority and liberty and equality and 
inequality that Todd identified. 
 
Our conclusions go beyond merely reinforcing the belief that the societies and 
economies of southern and eastern Britain, north west France, and the shores of the 
North Sea are stronger and more adaptable. By appearing to confirm that either family 
structures or their influence persist to the present, and may have a strong influence on 
growth and dynamism, our research suggests that any attempt to replicate that 
dynamism, labor mobility, or sectoral shifts elsewhere in Europe through targeted 
projects and investment may reap weaker dividends than expected. As well as the 
traditionally cited causes of regional disparity, such as peripherality or lower 
endowments of human capital and infrastructure (Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi 2004), 
policy makers may need to deal with institutional barriers related to inherited family 
structures and cultures particularly resistant to change. Indeed, it could be argued that 
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this is part of the evidence we require in order to explain why the impact of policy 
intervention in the past has been limited.  
 
The results of this paper may also have a bearing on the current debates in social 
capital regarding the origins, roles, and value of community and society type 
institutions. Families, or kinship groups could be seen as ‘concentrated’ or 
exaggerated forms of community, given their even more limited geographical spread, 
the more intense personal relationships, and even stronger barriers to entry.  However, 
nuclear families are somehow less ‘family-like’ than other, stronger forms of kinship 
in communitarian or stem family dominated areas, as there are much weaker personal 
links and more movement and mixing. In this way, it could be argued that in some 
ways, the differences between nuclear and stem families reflects the differences 
between society and community described in the social capital literature. 
Alternatively, we might investigate, as does Greif (2005), whether different family 
structures produce differing emphases on community and society, where nuclear 
families may be expected to lead to stronger society type institutions, and stem and 
communitarian family structures to stronger community type institutions. Whatever 
interpretative framework is used, it is reasonable to conclude that family structure 
deserves to be a fundamental component of the society and community debate.  
 
To some extent, we have only established that there are important questions to 
answer, rather than actually providing answers itself. Apart from attempting further 
analysis of the nature of the causative processes that have produced our correlations, 
other questions emerge. How much longer will the influence of family structures last, 
and what shape might it take in the future? Given the fact that the upheavals of the last 
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200 hundred years appear to have had little effect on the associations that family 
structure has with social and economic outcomes, perhaps we should expect its 
persistence to remain. On the other hand, it might be the case that mass migration and 
globalization will finally cause the patterns identified here to fade away.   
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Figure A1. Todd’s map of family types in western Europe (Source: Todd, 1990a) 
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